The Value of Intermediate Targets in Implementing Monetary Policy by Benjamin M. Friedman
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE VALUE OF INTERMEDIATE TARGETS IN
IMPLEMENTING MONETARY POLICY
Benjamin M. Friedman
Working Paper No. i18T




The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program
in Financial Markets and Monetary Economics. Any opinions
expressed are those of the author and not those of the T1ational
Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper t1487
November 1984
The Value of Intermediate Targets in
Implementing Monetary Policy
ABSTRACT
Thispaper reports empirical results indicating that there is no
compellingevidence in favor of singling outany one variable as "the
intermediatetarget" of monetary policy. Of the variables considered
here including money (Ml), credit, a long—term interest rate, and
whichever of either reserves or a short—term interest rate the Federal
Reserve System does not set directly by open market operations —most
do contain at least some statistically significant information about the
future growth of nominal income, real income, or prices. In most cases,
however, this information is significant statistically but not economically.
In other words, the reduction in forecasting error gained from using this
infoxmation is typically too small to be of great moment in a policy context.
The papers principal conclusion, therefore, is to cast doubt on the
practice of designating specific financial variables as intermediate targets
of monetary policy. To the extent that such targets are necessary for
independent reasons, however, the strength of this conclusion varies from
one potential intermediate target to another. Among the variables considered
here, credit growth and the long—term interest rate appear to offer the
best prospects of providing information that would be useful in formulating
and implementing monetary policy.
Although the empirical results reported here rely on an econometric
model that is extremely compact and simple, the method of analysis suggested
in this paper is more general. Its key contribution is to use a structural
model to address questions for which the previous literature has relied on
nonstructural methods. The application of this method of analysis to one
small, simple model here need be no more than an illustration. Applying it












Despite the growing experience with their use, both in the United
States and abroad, the role of intermediate targets of monetary policy
remains a source of confusion and controversy. Although some advocates
apparently regard stable growth of one or another monetary aggregate as
an end in itself, by far the more typical view in favor of such intermediate
targets is that they somehow enable the central bank to achieve more
effectively its objectives for the nonfinancial economy, usually including
pricestability or real growth,or both. It is in making that !somehowu
moreprecise,and thereby making the appropriate role (if any) of
intermediate targets operational, that the difficulty lies.
The ambiguity stems from the fact that measures like money or credit
are not under the immediatecontrol of the central bank.In the United
States,thedeposits that constitute the main bulk of any of the familiar
monetaryaggregates are created by over forty thousand financial institutions,
and how much money there is at any time depends on the decisions not only
ofthese institutions but of millions of individuals and businesses that
own deposits. Broader asset aggregates like total liquid assets depend on
the decisions of an even wider range of institutions, as do liability aggregates
like domestic nonfinancial credit. The Federal Reserve caninfluenceany
ofthese measures, to be sure, but it cannot directly control them in the
sense that it can control, for example, the nonborrowed reserve base or—2—
thefederal funds rate. Hence these measures are at most targets, not
instruments, of monetary policy, "intermediate" steps between the
instruments that the central bank can control directly anditsultimate
nonfinancial policy targets.
The objectof this paper isto assess quantitatively the potential
valueofspecific intermediate targets for monetary policy in the United
States.The basic premisemotivating this analysis is that a financial
variablelikemoney or credit —or, for that matter, a market interest
rate—haspotential value as an intermediate monetary policy target
only to the extent that movements in that variable convey information about
thenonfinancial economic developments which constitute the reason for
havinga monetary policyin the first place. Moreover, to warrantsuch
a variable's use as an intermediate target, the pertinent information its
movements contain must not be readily available elsewhere. The questions
addressed in this paper are whether any familiar financial variables in
factcontain such potentially valuable information, and, if so, which ones
and how much.
In addition to the specific conclusions provided as answers to these
questions, a key contribution of this paper is the method of analysis it
introduces. In particular, the paper suggests and implements a method for
using structural economic models, restricted } the relevant economic
theory, to answer questions that the previous literature has addressed
primarily with nonstructural, unrestricted representations of economic
behavior. The specific quantitative conclusions reached in this paper about
the potential value of intermediate targets in the monetary policy process
result from the application of this method to one rnacroeconometric model that
is especially small and simple. The method of analysis suggested here, however,—3—
is applicable more generally to models small and large, simple andcomplex.
SectionI outlines the basic concept of the intermediate target as
a wayof gathering and processing relevant information in implementing
monetary policy. Section II presents the small macroeconometric im.de1 of
the United States to be used in the quantitative analysis. Section III
applies this model to evaluate the potential usefulness of familiar
financial variables as intermediate targets when the chief nonfinancial
focusof monetary policy is the growth of nominal income. Section IV
undertakes an analogous evaluation focused separately on real income
growthandpriceinflation. Section V briefly summarizes the principal
conclusionsof this analysis and re—emphasizes some of its limitations.—4—
I. Intermediate Targets as InformationVariables1
Why should a central bank, in conducting monetary policy, take
account of the movements of money or credit?
Afternearly a decade of formal reliance on monetary aggregate
targets for monetary policy by the Federal Pserve System, and the adoption
of analogous targets by an increasing number of central banks around the
world,evento pose such a question may at first seem like so much inspecting
the interstices of the obvious (hardly an unknownactivityin the social
sciences). Yet the question is a serious one. In the circumstances under
which most central banks today actually conduct monetary policy, the relevance
of movements in money or credit is far from self—evident. Still less
self—evident is why central banks should elevate measures like money or
credit to the level of intermediate policy targets, thereby creating the
presumption that, in implementing monetary policy, they not only may but
indeed will respond to the movements of these variables.
At least part of the reason why this issue receives relatively little
serious attention in current discussions of monetary policy is probably
the fault of the professional economics literature, which more often than
not relies on hypothetical constructs that either rule the question out
altogether or in the end make the answerwithin those constructs —
genuinelyself—evident. At the theoretical level, for example, most models
simply treat the money stock as an "exogenous" variable, directly subject
to control by the central bank. In such models there can be no question
of the central bank's responding to movements of the money stock, because
by assumption the central bank initiates all such movements. Similarly, most
theoretical models include only one monetary asset, and in some models
that asset is the only available form of wealth holding.2 Such models, of—5—
course,cannot address the question of to which movements the central bank
maywantto respond when there are two or more monetary aggregates that
covary imperfectly. At the empirical level, much of the current discussion
simply assumes away the great body of evidence documenting the instability
of any simple specification of the relationship between nonfinancial
economic activity and any measure of "money."
The circumstances under which the Federal Reserve actually conducts
U.S. monetary policy are quite different. No monetary or credit aggregate
is directly subject to central bank control. Instead, the Federal
Reserve controls the growth of nonborrowed reserves, or perhaps a short--
terminterest rate like that on federal funds. Thereis not just a single
monetary asset. Instead, the market offers a great variety of forms of
deposits (and, similarly, an enormous variety of forms of borrowing), and
the number of potentially definable monetary (or credit) aggregates is
limited only by imagination and data collection machinery. No simple
money—incomeor credit-income relationship is consistently reliable over
shorttimehorizons. Moreover, given the pace andextent of changes in
patterns of U.S. financial intermediation, there is little ground for
strong confidence in such relationships over longer horizons either.
why, then, under these circumstances radically different from those
soofteneither explicitly assumed intheprofessional economics literature
or casually assumed in discussions of current policy, shouldthe Federal
Reserve take account of the movement of money or credit in implementing monetary
policy? The potential role of such variables in the policy process stems
from the possibility that their movements may provide information, which
is otherwise either unavailable or difficult to process, about the nonfinancial—6—
targetsthat the central bank seeks ultimately to affect.
The starting place for making monetary policy is a set of objectives
for the nonfinancial economy. In part because of the targeting and reporting
requirements imposed on the Federal Reserve by the Congress, but also
because much other planning takes an annual form, the typical procedure
in the United States involves the tentative identification each year
of a desired rate of economic growth for the year ahead, in both real and
nominal terms.3 The Federal Reserve then determine; and publicly reports
to the cbngress, the "target" rates of money and credit growth that are
likely —asseen in advance of the fact —tobe consistent with that
economic growth. Finally, the Federal Reserve determines, and implements
via open market operations, the growth of nonborrowed reserves (or the
federal funds rate level) that is likely —again,as seen in advance of the
fact —tobe consistent with the targeted growth of money and credit.4
As of the beginning of the year, therefore, the Federal Peserve in
principle outlines a mutually consistent set of growth rates for real
income, prices, money, creditandnonborrowed reserves, and ituses open
market operations to implement the one element in this package under its
direct control. The question at issue here is what further usefulness —
ifany —themoney and credit aggregates possess. If actual money or
credit growth deviates from the corresponding targeted pace, should the
Federal Peserve respond? And, if so, why, since the ultimate policy
objective is to affect notmoneyor credit growth but real economic growth
andprice inflation?
Responding to aberrant movements in money or credit growth is a
useful policy under these conditions only if such movements forewarn—7—
subsequent(or contemporaneous but as yet unobservable) movements of real
output or prices. For example, money growth greater than targeted —
thatis, greater than expected in advance to be consistent with the
desiredgrowth of income and prices —mayindicate that later on either
real income or prices (or both) will advance more strongly than expected.
If so, responding to this excessive money growth by reducing the growth
of nonborrowed reserves will set in motion forces of adjustment —involving
in the first instance higher short-term interest rates, but in addition
much broader aspects of asset yield and price relationships —tohelp
restrain the excessive nonfinancial economic activity. Similarly, if
money growth less than targeted forewarns coming economic weakness, responding
by increaaing reserve growth will set in motion forces acting to bolster
activity levels. The rationale for responding to either faster or slower
than targeted credit growth is analogous,
Thisfamiliar monetary policy procedure, based on targeted growth
rates for money and credit (or, more commonly, money only) suffers
from two potential drawbacks. The first, of course, is that aberrant
movementsof the targeted aggregate maynotindicate future economic strength
orweakness after all. Instead, they may merely reflect shifts in the
portfolio preferences of either financial institutions or the general deposit—
holding and liability-issuing public. In that case, policy responses in
the form of changes in reserve growth (or in short—term interest rate levels)
will be counter—productive, pushing nonfinancial activity away from, rather
than toward, its intended course. Whether or not the Federal Reserve should
respond to such unexpected movements of money or credit therefore depends,
in the first instance, on what information about future economic activitythese movements convey. A large and long—standing empirical literature
has examined this question, primarily using "nonstructural" methods that
rely on no specific economic model.5
The second potential shortcoming in the use of monetary and credit
aggregates as intermediate policy targets isthatwhatever information about
futureactivity levels these aggregates do convey may simply duplicate
information readily available from other convenient sources. Given the
large element of inertia in short—run fluctuations of economic activity,
surely the first place to look for information about income growth in
the near future is in the recent movements of income itself. In other
words, the relevant question is not just whether a potential intermediate
target provides information about future income growth but whether it
provides information not already contained in recent movements of income
itself. A large empirical literature has addressed this question too,
again primarily using nonstructuralmethods.6 It is also possible to
frame this question in a much broader way by asking whether yet other
readily available data mayalsocontain the same information that movements
of money or credit convey, but the policy implications of empirical
findings in this broader context are less straightforward because of the
difficulty inherent in strategies explicitly relating monetary policy
respsesto large numbers of different variables.
The task undertaken in this paper is to address these questions
about the information contained in potential intermediate targets of
monetary policy, using a small tstructuraltt macroeconometric model of
the United States. The key advantage of basing the analysis on a
structural model, in comparison to the moreprevalent use of nonstructural
methodsin the recent literature, lies in the presumably superior representation-9
of"expected" economic behavior, and hence the superior division of the
respective movements of variables like income, money and credit into
corresponding expected and "surprise" components, that the structural
model provides. The answer to any question about the information contained
in unexpected movements in money or credit can be only as valid as the underlying
distinction of expected versus unexpected movements on which it relies.
3y relying on nonstructural (usually vector autoregression) models for this
purpose,the recent literature irpiicitiy assumes that the best available
representationof the expected movement ofany variable is an unrestricted
linearprojection from past values of itself and other variables, and
identifies any difference between this projection and the corresponding
actual movement as unexpected. A structural model instead uses the relevant
economic theory to restrict the representation of a variable's expected
movement, and hence also to identify the unexpected part of its actual
movement.
A further advantage of basing the analysis on a structural model
is that structural models typically make clear the relationships among
the operating instruments, potential intermediate targets, and nonfinancial
objectives of monetary policy. Empirical findings therefore have a ready
interpretation in terms of the policy process, and specific results correspond
in a straightforward way to rules for central bank response. By contrast,
evidence generated without using any structural model is at best difficult
to translate into policy implications.
The countervailing disadvantage of the structural approach, of
course, is that the particular structural model used may rely on theory
that is irrelevant or invalid. In that case the restrictions imposed may—10—
make the model's representation of expected economic behavior, and hence
thecorresponding distinction of expected versus unexpected movements in
any given variable, not superior but inferior to their unrestricted
nonstructural analogs. Similarly, if a model does not adequately represent
the relevant macroeconomic behavior, policy rules suggested by its properties
maybe misdirected and even counterproductive. Given its compactness and
simplicity, the model used here is clearly illustrative rather than definitive.
Section II presents a smallmacroeconometricmodel, and Sections III
and IV go on to analyze its implications for the information value of potential
monetary policy targets. Pn important caveat is in order, however, before
proceeding to that task. Even thefindingthat aberrant movements of nney
or credit contain information about future economic activity, and that that
informationis not readily available elsewhere, does not warrant taking
account of this information by establishing money or credit as an intermediate
target in any strict sense. The Federal Reserve should respond to such
information,to be sure, and it may even be useful to establish a form of
"targeting"procedure to institutionalize the presumption that it will do
so. In general, however, the appropriate policy response is different —
undermost realistic circumstances, more modest —thanthat required to
return money or credit fully to the corresponding targeted path.7—11—
II.A Macroeconorretic Model
Table 1 shows estimates, based on U.S. quarterly data spanning
1961:1-1979:111, for the six-equation Pirandello Model first presented
in Friedman (1977) and subsequently updated in Clarida and Friedman
(1983). The model includes empirical estimates for relationships describing
aggregatedemand, aggregate supply, money demand, money supply and the
term structure of interest rates, plus a nominal income identity.8 For
convenience,all equations are linear in logarithms, and no variable is
lagged more than once. Hence the model is a simple linear first—order
difference equation system.
The reason for limiting the model's estimation to data through
1979:111 is that there is evidence of a break after that date in all
five of the estimated relationships.To the extent thatthe conditions
newlycharacterizing the immediate post-1979:III period continue to
prevail, the model is therefore a description of historical behavior
only. More recently, however, the Federal Reserve System appears to
have moved away from the new policy procedures adopted in October 1979.10
The model may therefore be applicable to current behavior as well, even
though not to that of the few years immediately following 1979:111.
The model 's aggregate demand equation includes an interest rate, or
IS curve, effect (here based simply on a nominal long-term interest rate),
as well as a fiscal policy effect and a terms—of—trade effect. The
aggregate supply equation relates price setting to real economic activity
and also to the terms of trade. The money demand equation has the
standardreal LMcurve specification. The money supply equation combines
anonborrowed reserves multiplier effect with a borrowed reserves responseTABLE 1
EQUATIONSOF THE PIRANDELLO MODEL
(1)Aggregate Demand
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(6)Nominal Incon Identity
= +APt
(continued on next page)Table 1, page2
Notes: Equations are estimated using Fair's method for simultaneous equations
with lagged dependent variables and serially correlated
disturbances.
Sample period is 1961:1—1979:111.
Numbers in parentheses are t—statistics.
Allvariablesare in logarithms.
Predetermined variables are E, I, L, R,rD andS.
Definitions of Symbols: E =high—employmentfederal expenditures
I=importprice deflator L =outstandinglong—term federal debt
M =moneystock (Ml) P =GNPprice deflator
R =stockof nonborroved reserves
rD =discountrate
rL =Baacorporate bond rate
rs =three—monthTreasury bill rate S =outstandingshort-term federal debt
X =realGNP
Y =nominalGNP—12—
associatedwith the discount rate and an excess reserves response
associated with the short—term market interest rate. The term
structure equation, which provides a link between the long—term interest
rate in the aggregate demand equation and the short—term interest rate in
the money demand and money supply equations, combines a form of the
standard expectations hypothesis with a debt management policy effect.12
The nominal income identity is straightforward.
As estimated here, these six relationships determine six
variables: the growth rate of nominal and real income, prices and money,
andshort—and long—term interest rates. Exogenous variables include
monetary policy (nonborrowed reserves and the discount rate), fiscal
policy (high-employment government expenditures), debt management
policy (the maturity composition of outstanding government debt), and
the dollar price of imports.
P.nalternative way of specifying the stochastic structure of the
model is to assume that the direct instrument set by the Federal Peserve's
open market operations is not the growth of nonborrowed reserves but
the short-term interest rate. In that case, the short-term rate would be
an exogenous condition variable, while nonborrowed reserves would be one
of the six variables jointly determined by the model. Because the Federal
Reserve is free to choose either nonborrowed reserves or the short—term
interest rate as its operating instrument, and because there is some
ambiguity about how Federal Reserve policy has actually operated in the
past, it is interesting to know the model's implications for key
policy questions under either specification. Sections IIIandIVbelow
thereforereport parellel sets of results along just these lines. anging-13-
the assurrd stochastic structure of the relationships among the model's
variables in general changes the corresponding estimated coefficients,
however, so that the alternative sets of results based on an interest rate
instrument rely on a different set of coefficient estimates (not shown)
than the ones based on a reserves instrunnt shown in Table 1.13
The pirandello Model's compactness and simplicity result, of course,
fromthe imposition of many restrictions on the data. Those restrictions
necessarily limit —although,apparently, to a surprisingly small degree —
themodel's ability to represent actual macroeconomic behavior.14 The
corresponding advantage purchased by those restrictions is not just
convenience but the facility that the resulting model's form provides for
explicitlyanalyzing policy questions like the ones addressed here.—14—
iii. Intermediate Targets for Nominal Income
A familiar, albeit simplified, representation of the process of
choosing and implementing monetary policy targets begins by positing a
desired growth rate for nominal income for some period ahead, then
translates that desired income growth into the isplied growth of the
money stock, and in turn translates that money growth into the implied
growth of nonborrowed reserves. The two translation steps involved could
be as simple (simple—minded?) as merely allowing for average trend
movements, first in monetary "velocity" and then in the "money multiplier,"
or they could incorporate sophisticated econometric and/or judgmental
predictions of the dynamic money—income andmoney—reservesrelationships.
Carrying out this task using the model shown in Table 1 would stand
somewhere in between.
Given such a model, and given the values of the four exogenous
variables other than nonborrowed reserves over the relevant time period,
it is straightforward to determine what rate of reserves growth the
Federal Peserve System should implement in order to make the conditionally
expected nominal income growth over this period equal to any chosen rate.
The model also indicates what rate of money growth to expect over
this period, given the implemented reserves growth as well as the
assumed values of all other "predetermined" variables —including,
irtportantly, the serially correlated disturbances tothe model's five
stochastic relationships -
Asthe first entry in the left—hand column of Table 2 shows, the
standard deviation of the model's forecasting error for nominal income
growth an indefinite number of quarters ahead (that is,the final-form
residual corresponding to a forecast for a period sufficientlyfarintheTABLE 2
STANDARDERRORS FOR NOMINAL INCOME RESIDUAL AUTOREGRESSIONS









future to eliminate altogether the role of information about the model's
endogenous variables) is l.l9%.15 In the absence of any other information
external to the model, therefore, nominal income growth at a long horizon
out would be within about a 1/4% range of the forecast value two—thirds
of the time. The remaining entries in the column also show that the availability
of observations on recent income growth helps somewhat in predicting future
incomegrowth. Making the forecast of future income growth conditional
also on observations of recent income growth reduces this range to about
for periods up to four quarters ahead. In other words, the model's
final—form residuals are serially correlated, so that taking account of whether
income growth has been higher or lower than expected in the recent past
(that is, allowing for previous final—form residuals) reduces the model's
forecasting error in comparison with the corresponding "uninformed"
forecast.Because allowing for this additional information in general
changes the model's conditional forecast of income growth, it also in
general changes the reserves growth necessary to make the conditional
expectationof income growth equal the same chosen rate as before.
What, then, is the potential role for the rate of money growth
—orany other intermediate policy target —inthe policy process?
If observed money growth different from prior expectations also provides
informationthat bears on future income growth, then a forecast cf
future income growth conditional on recent money growth will likewise
be superior to the corresponding uninformed forecast. In addition, as
in the case of information contained in recent income growth, allowing
for the information contained in recent money growth in general changes—16—
thereserves growth necessary to make the conditional expectation of future
incougrowth equal the same chosen rate as before, and hence in general
warrants a policy response in the form of a different rate of reserves
growth.
The initial question to ask, therefore, is whethermoney growth
in fact contains such potentially useful information. Moreover,as
thediscussion in Section I explains, establishing a presumption that the
Federal 1serve will respond to whatever information is contained in
money growth, rather than simply responding to observed income growth,
makes sense only if the information contained in money growth is not
also contained in income growth itself.
The first column ofTable 3reports standard errors for a series of
equations relatingthemodel's final—form income growth residuals to
lagged values of the corresponding final—form residuals for money growth
and, in all but the first tequations, lagged valuesof the income
growthresidual itself. For a model as sirrple as the one used here, it
would be possible to infer these standard errors (or their equivalents)
directly from the properties of the model's estimated coefficients, but the
point of instead usingregressionslike those underlyingTable 3is to
illustrate amethod ofanalysis that is readily applicable to more coxrp1ex
models as well. The first two values shown indicate, in couarison to the
standard error of 1.19% reported for the uninformed forecast in Table 2,
that movements of money growth do contain information about future income
growth.Even so, couarison with the other standard errors reported in
Table 2showsthat this information is little greater than that contained in
recent movements of income growth.
The issue, however, is not whether money growth contains more or less








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































information not contained in income growth. The next two values shown
in the first column of Table 3 are standard errors for equations relating
nominal income residuals to lagged values of the money growth residual
and the income growth residual itself, entered with comparable timing.
Comparisonwith the corresponding standard errors based on lagged income
growth alone, shown in Table 2, indicates that the additional information
contained inmoney growth is significant statistically but not economically.16
A reductionin the standarderror of the "informed" forecast from 1.04%
to0.98% (or from 1.02% to 0.94%) is hardly ground for establishing money
growth as an intermediate policy target.
These comparisons are not necessarily apt, however, if data on money
growth become available before data on income growth. It maystillbe
useful for theFederalReserve to react to the information contained
inmoney growth if the information contained in income growth, which
it duplicates, is unavailable. Even with a further one— or two—quarter
lag imposed on the income growth residuals but not the money growth
residuals, however, there is still apparently little additional information
contained in money growth. The last three values shown in the first
column of Table 3 are standard errors for regressions relating nominal
income growth to lagged money growth and to lagged income growth itself
with just such differential lags. Once again, the additional information
contained in money growth is statistically significant, but hardly enough
to matter economically.
Money growth is not the only financial variable that may contain
potentially useful information in this context, of course, and in
principle the Federal Reserve may instead choose to alter the growth of
nonborrowed reserves in an analogous way in response to soii otherreadily—18—
observablefinancial variable. The model used here, with nonlorrowed reserves
taken to be the direct operating instrument of rronetary policy, generates
forecast values (and hence, after the fact, final—form residuals) not just for
money growth but also for short— and long—term interest rates. The second and
third columns of Table 3 present results, analogous to those based on money
growth in the first column, for tests of the information about future nominal
income growth contained in either of the two interest rates.
Theseresults provide no ground at all for the Federal Reserve s
responding to movements in short—term interest rates, and they suggest
that the case for responding to long—term rates is about comparable to that
for responding to money. The standard errors for the equations including
theshort—term rate residuals, shown in the second column, are uniformly
larger than those of the corresponding equationsincluding the money growth
residuals, and the information contained in short-term rates is typically
not statistically significant. The standard errors for the equations
includingthe long-term interest rate residuals are only marginally larger
than those of the corresponding equations including money growth, and the
information contained in long-term rates is always statistically significant.
The reuction i.n standard error, however, is again never sizeable enough to
make the indicated responses. very interesting in apolicycontext
The three financial variables that are endogenous in this model
money growth and short— and long—term interest rates do not constitute
the entire universe of potentially useful intermediate target variables
for monetary policy. The final column of Table 3 reports analogous results
for tests of the information about future nominal income growth contained
in movements of aggregate credit growth. These results are based on a model
identical to that shown in Table 1, except that the financial quantity used—19—
in the third and fourth equations is total domestic nonfinancial credit,
so that these equations become,ineffect, "credit demand" and 'credit supply"
equations.17 The resulting model is highly similar to that shown in Table 1,
asthe properties of the final-form income growth residuals reported in
the right—hand column of Table 2 indicate. In addition, the results (not
shown)of regression tests for the information content of the short—
andlong—term interestrateresiduals in this altered model are very similar
to the corresponding results shown in the second and third columns of Table 3.
The results based on this altered irodel, reported in the final
column of Table 3, indicate that the credit aggregate apparently offers
the best prospect of any of the candidates considered here as a potential
interemediatetarget for rrvnetary policy. The standard errors for the
equations including credit growth residuals are uniformly smaller than
thosefor the corresponding equations including the residuals for any
of the other three variables, despite the slightly larger bases of comparison
shown in the right—hand column of Table 2. Moreover, the additional
information contained in recent movements of credit, beyond what is already
ntained in nominal income itself, is typically greater than that contained
in anyoftheotherthree variables. With a single parallel lag on both
credit andincome,for example, the reduction instandard error is from
1.08% to 0.93%. WIth foirlags andatwo-quarter delay on the receipt of
incomedata, the comparablereductionis from 1.10% to 0.92%.
Finally, itisalso interesting to consider the value of potential
intermediatetargets for monetary policy when the Federal Reserve conducts
open market operations by setting the shot-'term interest rate rather than
thegrowth of nonborrowed reserves. The first three columns of Table 4



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































version of the Pirandello Model estimated with the short-term interest rate
taken as exogenous and reserves growth, along with money growth and the
long—term interest rate, endogenous. The final column of Table 4 presents
further analogous results based on this alternative model estimated with
credit in place of money. The results show that, if the Federal Peserve's
direct operating instrument is the short-term interest rate, only the
long—term interest rate (among the four variables considered here)
consistently exhibits potentially useful information about future movennts
of nominal income.—21—
Iv.IntermediateTargets for Peal Income and Prices
The analysis in Section III proceeds from the simplifying
assumption that it is possible to summarize the Federal Reserve Systems
objectives for the nonfinancial economy in terms of desired growth
of nominal income. This practice is broadly familiar, both because it
sidesteps the arbitrariness inevitably involved in weighting two or
more ultimate policy objectives, and also because some economists have
-,1 4-4 4— - ,- 4— -,.- 1 - 1 ... -4--.-l— .-..-1 4-l- .4— _iLD '_4.'_. '..GU aL. L''..L WJLLL1cLI_J..LLLLflLLtWi. LLIL) UL
affectingthe division of nominal income between real and price elements.
Familiar as it is, however, focusing only on nominal income is not
fully satisfactory for purposes of a discussion of intermediate targets for
monetary policy. The most immediate reason is that the choice of an
appropriate growth rate for the money stock, the most traditional
intermediate target variable, is not invariant to the real-price composition
of the associated nominal income growth. Although it is standard to
assume a unit price elasticity of the demand for money, empirical
evidence consistently indicates an income elasticity of (Ml) money
demand well below unity)8 Hence the money growth that would be consistent
with any chosen nominal income growth is greater as the underlying rate
of price inflation is greater and the corresponding real growth smaller.
More fundamentally in the policy context considered here, the appropriate
central bank response to information about future price inflation in
general differs from the appropriate response to information about future
growth of real economic activity.
It is also interesting, therefore, to look beyond the information
thatpotential monetary policy target variables contain about nominal income—22--
to see what information they contain about, at the least, real income and
prices. Table 5 provides a basis for the relevant comparisons by showing
standard errors of the Pirandello Model's final—form residuals for real
income growth and price inflation (and the corresponding residuals of the
model with credit) analogous to those shown in Table 2 for the model's
nominal income residuals.19 The residuals for price inflation exhibit
substantial serial correlation, but the real income residuals. do not..
The upper panel of Table 6 presents standard errors, analogous to
thosein Table 3, for equations relating the model's final—form real growth
residuals to lagged values of the final-form residuals for the model's
endogenous financial variables and, in mostcases,to lagged values of the
real growth residual itself. The results show that movements in both
money growth andcreditgrowth, and especiallyin the long—term interest
rate, consistently provide statistically significant information about future
real income growth beyond that contained in recent values of real income
growth.Conarison to Table 5 shows, however that theassociated reduction
ofthe real growth forecasting error due to observed money growth or
credit growth is too small to warrant much attention in a policy context.
By contrast, that due to observed long—term interest rates —forexample,
from 1.00% to 0.82% with a two—quarter lag on real income data —issmall but
perhaps worth a policy response.
The lower panel of Table 6 presents standard errors for equations
analogously relating the model's final—form residuals for price inflation to
laggedvalues of the other residuals and lagged values of the inflation
residual itself. These results show that movements in both money growth and
credit growth, and in the short—term interest rate, consistently provide
statistically significant information about future inflation beyond thatTABLE 5
STANDARD ERRORS FOR REAL INCOME AND PRICE RESIDUAL AUTOREGRESSIONS
Model from Table 1 Model with Credit
Included Lags AX AP Ax AP
None .0093 .0059 .0101 .0054
1 .0091 .0039 .0098 .0038
1,2 .0091 .0037 .0099 .0037
1,2,3 .0091 .0036 .0099 .0036
1,2,3,4 .0091 .0036 .0099 .0036
2,3,4 .0092 .0040 .0100 .0039
3,4 .0092 .0041 .0100 .0040


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































contained in recent inflation. Here it is questionable, however, whether
the resulting reduction of the model's inflation forecasting error
due to the information in any of these financial variables —atmost,
from0.41% to 0. 34% for the short-term interest rate and with a two—quarter
lag on inflation data —iso value in a policy context,
Finally, Table 7 presents standard errors for both real incon
growth and price inflation residuals that are analogous to thoseshown
in Table 6 but based on the alternative version of the Pirandello Model
estimated under the assumption that the direct operating instrument of
nonetary policy is the short-term interest rate. Here the long-term
interestrate stands out in consistently providing statistically significant
information about future real income growth. Credit growth, and,to a
slightlylesser extent, money growth and reserves growth all provide










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































v. Conclusions and Caveats
The basic premise underlying the analysis in this paper is that
any financial variable has potential value as an intermediate target
for monetary policy only if observed movements of that variable contain
information about the likely future movements of whatever aspects of
nonfinancial economic activity the central bank seeks ultimately to
affect. Further, keying monetary policy responses to observed movements
ofanysuchvariable is sensible only if the relevant information it
contains is not also contained in other readily available sources —
inthe first instance, from observed movements of nonfinancial activity
itself.
The exrirical results presented in this paper, based on a small
quarterly inacroeconometric model of the United States, indicate the
absence of compelling evidence in favor of singling out any single variable
as "the intermediate targett' of monetary policy. Of the variables
considered here —includingmoney (Ml), credit, a long—term interest
rate, and whichever of either reserves or a short—term interest rate the
FederalPeserve $ystemdoes not etdirectlyby open market Qperatlons. —
mostdo contain at least some statistically significant information about
the future growth of nominal income, real income, or prices. In most
cases, however, this information is significant statistically but not
economically.In other words, the reduction in forecasting error gained
from using it is typically too small to be of great moment in a policy
context.
The paper's principal conclusion, therefore, is to cast doubt on the
practice of designating specific financial variables as intermediate targets—25—
ofmonetary policy. To the extent that such targets are necessary for
other reasons, however —-forexample, to facilitate Congressional oversight
of the Federal Fserve's policy decisions —thestrength of this conclusion
varies from one potential intermediate target to another. 1mong the
variables considered here, credit growth and the long—term interest rate
appear to offer the best prospects of providing information that would be
useful in formulating and implementing monetary policy. For example, when
the direct operating instrument is growth of nonborrowed reserves and the
ultimate policy objective is stated in terms of nominal income, the reduction
in forecast standard error associated with the information contained in credit
growth is 0.18%. Even so, specific results like this one for credit growth
arenotinvariant to the assumed operating instrument and ultimate nonfinancial
objective, nor to the assumed pattern of data availability, so that any
positive irrlications for the use of intermediate targets for monetary
policy are at best highly conditional.
Severalfurther caveats about the findings reported here are also worth
repeating. First, the analysis in this paper focuses only on the question of
information contained in single financial variables. It therefore omits
entirely the possibility that the movements of two (or more) such
variables, in conjunction, may provide potentially valuable information
not contained in either alone. Because the Federal Reserve currently
specifies either "target ranges" or "monitoring ranges" for four financial
aggregates, this possibility certainly bears investigation. Empirical
findings along suchlines would also have implications for the difficult
questionof how the Federal Reserve should respond when two of its
designatedtarget variables give conflicting signals.—26—
Second,it is irrortant to re-emphasize that the appropriate ircnetary
policyresponse to the information contained in unexpected movements of any
designated financial variable is in general not to take actions that would
returnthat variable toits previously expected path —thatis, to treat
it as an intermediate target in the traditional sense. Unless there is a
one—for—onerelationship betweenobserved movements in the financial variable
andlikely future movements of the relevant aspects of nonfinancial economic
activity, the appropriate policy response is insteadto use the information
that the financial variable provides by taking action expected to return
not it but nonfinancial activity to the previously targeted path.
Finally, the analysis reported here relies on an econometric model
that is extremelycompact and sisple. The rrodel apparently does a surprisingly
good job at capturing some of the main features of macroeconomic behavior,
butit necessarily omits manymore.The method of analysis suggested in
this paper for using a structural model to address questions for which the
previousliteraturehas relied on nonstructural models, however, is more
general. The application here to one small, simple model need be no more than
an illustration. Aparallel analysis based on a more powerful, and presumably
more trustworthy model would be a staghtfoward extension ofthisresearch.Footnotes
*This paper was prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City seminar
onPrice tabi1ity and Public Policy, held in Jackson, Wyoming, August, 1984.
I am greateful to Diane cbyle for research assistance and helpful discussions;
toAndrew Abel, Mark Watson and participants in the Federal Reserve Bank
seminar, including especially Stephen Goldfeld, for helpful comments on an
earlier draft;andto the National Science Foundation andthe Alfred P. Sloan
Foundationfor research support.
1. This section relies in part on arguments developed at a formal level in
Brunner and rltzer (1967), Tobin (1970), Poole (1970), Kareken et al.
(1973), andFriedman(1975).
2. It is astonishing that some economists, having hypothesized models including
a single form of wealth holding, proceed to label that single asset
"money"andthen draw logical inferences on which they then base
recommendations about actual monetary policy.
3. Because of lags (inertia), of course, not all desired growth rates of
either prices or real income arefeasible. The discussion here assumes
achoice from withinthefeasible range.
4. Before October 1979, the Federal Reserve's operating instrument was
typicallythe federal funds rate. Thereafter itwas the growth of
nonborrowed reserves. Wallich (1984) has stated that, beginning from
late 1982 on, it was borrowed reserves.
5.Thaditional references include Friedman and Schwartz (1963)and Andersen
and Jordan (1968).
6. See, for example, Sims (1972, 1980) and Friedman (1983, and forthcoming).
7. One reason for the more modest response, analyzed by Poole (1970), and
Friedman (1975), is that in general such an aberrant movement reflects
some combination of unexpected economic strength or weakness and
unexpected shifts in portfolio preferences. A second reason, analyzed
byBrainard (1967), is that policy makers do not know with certainty
the correct values of the parameters describing the economic effects of
policy actions.
8. The only change in specification from the original 1977 model is due
to the use of Ml rather than M2 as the monetary variable. The estimates
shownin Table 1 are from the Appendix to Clarida and Friedman (1983)
9.By contrast, there is no evidence of a break after 1976:11,the endpoint
ofthe sample originally used in Friedman (1977). See the comparisonof
F—statisticsin Table 5 of Clarida and Friedman (1983).
10. See again Wallich (1984).
11. The coefficients of the two interest rate terms in the money supply
equation are not significant individually but are highly significant
jointly. The test statistic for the null hypothesis that both coefficients
are zero is x2(2) =16.2.12. The coefficients on the two short—term interest rate termsin the
term structure equation are not significant individually but are
highly significant jointly. The test statistic forthe null
hypothesis that both coefficients are zero isx2(2) =10.4.
13. As an historical matter, of course, only one (at most) ofthese two
descriptions of the monetary policy process can be correctfor the
model's estimating period. It is in general not valid to draw inferences
from a model estimated assuming a stochastic structure differentthan that
which characterized actual behavior during the estimation period. The
relevant question here is which of the two policy instruments was
exogenous during that period.
14. See the discussion in Clarida and Friedman (1983). For a comparative
analysis of the model's predictive behavior see Mahoney etal. (1983).
15. The final form of the simple model used here is just itssolved—out
autoregressive representation. If the structural model iswritten as
+By+Cx +u
t t-l t t
where y and x are vectors of endogenous and exogenous variables,
respectively, and u is a vector of disturbances to the structural
relationships, then the model's final form is
—l 1
CO —1 —l
y = [(I-A) B]'(I-A) Cx + [(I-A) B]1(I-A) u i=0
The final—form forecast (the expected movement in y) for any periodis
then
. 1— _t
and the corresponding final—form residual (the unexpectedmovement) is
Co —li —1
=-= i0[(I—A) B] (I-A) u
t t t t
Because estimation of the model provides values of uonly from1961:1
on, the calculation of E(andtherefore all results based on Creported
in Tables 2-7 below) beginsin 1964 :1, thereby avoiding possible problems
associated with truncation of the infinite sum.(An alternative procedure
would be to calculate Cfromx values extending back before 1961 :1, but
data are not available for all of the exogenous variablesfor enough prior
quarters.) Analogous results for calculations beginningin 1966:1 show
no essential difference.
16. The significance levels reported in Table 3 (andin Tables 4,6 and 7
below) are for the t- or F-statistics pertaining to theinformation
variables (for example, unexpected money growth) in the regressions
indicated. These significance levels strictly rest on the assumption
that the remaining unexplained residual variation in these regressions
is not serially correlated. This assumption is apparentlyplausible in
most cases. For example, of the Durbin—Watson valuesfor the seven
regressions in the first column of Table 3 (the sevenregressions based
on unexpected money growth), only one indicatesserial correlation that isstatistically significant at the .05 level. The significance levels
reported in Tables 3,4, 6 and 7 also strictly rest on the assumption
that the model's exogenous variables, including policy variables, are
not affected by feedback from the endogenous variables. This assumption,
of course, is more dubious.
17.This procedure is clearly inferior to the more ambitious undertaking of
respecifying these equations to represent the demand for and supply of
credit more appropriately. It does, however, render the results more
directly comparable with those based on the model including money.
18. For recent years only, there is also some evidence of a non—unit price
elasticity.
19. The final—form residuals used as the basis for these calculationsare
againfor the model estimated with reserves exogenous.References
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